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INVISIBLE ADJUDICATION IN THE U.S. COURTS OF 
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By Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill and Fatma Marouf* 
 
PUBLICATION PENDING/SUBJECT TO REVISION 
106 GEO. L. J. ___ (2017) 
 
Non-precedent decisions are the norm in federal appellate 
courts, and are seen by judges as a practical necessity given 
the size of their dockets. Yet the system has always been 
plagued by doubts. If only some decisions are designated to 
be precedents, questions arise about whether courts might 
be acting arbitrarily in other cases. Such doubts have been 
overcome in part because nominally unpublished decisions 
are available through standard legal research databases. This 
creates the appearance of transparency, mitigating concerns 
that courts may be acting arbitrarily. But what if this 
appearance is an illusion? This Article reports empirical data 
drawn from a study of immigration appeals showing that 
many – and in a few circuits, most – decisions by the federal 
courts of appeals are in fact unavailable and essentially 
invisible to the public. The Article reviews the reasons why 
non-publication is a practical, constitutional and 
philosophical challenge for judges. It argues that the 
existence of widespread invisible adjudication calls for a re-
thinking of the way courts operate and the way scholars 
study them.  
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I. Introduction 
 
Whenever a lawyer searches for federal appellate cases, 
Westlaw and LEXIS offer two kinds of results: reported decisions 
and unreported decisions. On their face, these labels are strange. If 
a case was actually unreported or actually unpublished, it would 
not appear on a search engine, and might emerge into the public 
eye only through a leak. We know, of course, that “unreported” or 
“unpublished” are really antiquated terms for non-precedential. 
But this implicit understanding points to a deeper question.  
Although the appellate opinion is the centerpiece of American 
law, and the primary text for American legal education, it “is now 
the exception rather than the rule.”1 Does the existence of 
“unpublished” or non-precedential decision-making threaten basic 
assumptions about how our courts operate?  
In fact, from roughly 2000 to 2006, the propriety of non-
precedential decisions generated a fierce debate. One federal 
circuit court of appeals held, briefly, that its own practice of 
issuing non-precedent decisions was unconstitutional. The 
objection was simple: When a court says that a decision is not a 
precedent, the court seems to be saying is that the court might be 
acting outside the law, or at least inconsistently from established 
rules of law. Many scholars intervened in the debate, many of 
them expanding on the constitutional objections. Two other 
circuits took on the issue, issuing strong opinions defending the 
practice of non-precedential decisions, producing a circuit split.2 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that lawyers 
could be sanctioned for mentioning unpublished decisions in their 
briefs.3 A Supreme Court showdown seemed likely. Congressional 
hearings were held. 
The controversy was diffused, if not resolved, by revisions 
to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure in 2006. Once the 
new rules went into effect in 2007, lawyers (in federal court, at 
 
1 Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 761, 762 (2004). 
2 See discussion, infra, at Part V. 
3 See discussion, infra, at Part V; discussion at text corresponding to notes 82-91. 
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least) are now allowed to talk about “unreported” decisions. This 
did not clarify what if any precedential value should be given to 
these decisions. But it seemed to instill a kind of transparency that 
enabled courts to continue a practice they have found 
indispensible as they cope with burgeoning dockets. Some judges 
have pointed to the fact that unpublished opinions are actually 
available as a safeguard against arbitrary behavior by courts.4 While 
it remains unclear why some appellate decisions are precedents 
while others are not (or at least of less precedential value) the fact 
that we can see both kinds when we do basic research offers some 
comfort that courts are less likely to act arbitrarily because they are 
acting in the open. 
But what if this transparency is a myth? What if the fact 
that some unpublished decisions appear on search results creates 
an illusion that all such decisions are available? What if there are in 
fact many high stakes cases decided on the merits that are invisible 
through standard legal research tools? What if much appellate 
adjudication in the United States is, in reality, invisible?  
 We have discovered that this appears to be the case in at 
least one high stakes area of federal appellate litigation: petitions to 
review orders of removal issued against immigrants by the 
Department of Justice. For several years, we have been conducting 
empirical research on immigration adjudication.5 Because we were 
initially interested in preliminary procedural questions that arise in 
these cases and in how different circuit courts manage their case 
loads, we did not use Westlaw or LEXIS. Instead, we mined data 
from PACER, the federal courts’ electronic docket management 
system, a system set up for practitioners to file documents with 
the court but not for research purposes. PACER includes the full 
universe of immigration petitions filed with the courts of appeals, 
many of which are rapidly dismissed on purely procedural 
grounds, for instance if the petitioner failed to pay a filing fee or 
failed to submit a brief. We never expected these cases to be in 
Westlaw or LEXIS.  
 
4 See discussion, infra, at note 104. 
5 See Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 337 (2014); Michael Kagan, Fatma Marouf and Rebecca Gill, Buying Time? False Assumptions About 
Abusive Appeals, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679 (2014). 
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However, we were surprised to find that many cases that 
PACER showed had been decided on substantive grounds also 
did not appear when we looked for them in Westlaw or LEXIS. 
As we report in this Article, Westlaw includes almost none of 
them. LEXIS is better  - but still is missing large numbers, 
including nearly half of the decisions in the largest circuit with the 
most immigration cases.6 However, PACER does not allow us to 
actually read the decision in many instances because the document 
– the court’s decision – is locked in the database, accessible only 
to the parties to that individual matter. What this means is that we 
can see that the case exists and that it was decided, but we often 
cannot see the content of the decision because many such 
documents are locked. Moreover, even for unlocked decisions, a 
litigant searching for a similar fact pattern or legal question would 
not be able to find them, because PACER does not have a text-
based search feature. In other words, there is a wide body of 
invisible immigration decision-making occurring in the circuit 
courts, producing decisions that are truly unpublished, not merely 
designated as non-precedents. 
In this essay, we report our findings and explore the 
implications of widespread invisible adjudication in the federal 
appellate courts. We trace the practical origins and evolution of 
unpublished or non-precedential decision-making. We explore the 
early philosophical debates about the nature of the common law 
that laid the groundwork both for our current system of selective 
precedent, and the objections to it. We review the circuit split that 
emerged about whether this system is constitutional. 
With this background, we wish to promote two main 
assertions. The first assertion relates to the way our courts operate. 
The fact that a great deal of federal appellate litigation on a subject 
of considerable public interest is hidden from public view should 
reignite the debate about unpublished decisions. Rather than 
remain in the state of constructive ambiguity that has prevailed 
since 2006, the courts should provide clear answers about whether 
it is proper to consider only some appellate decisions precedent, 
 
6 See discussion, infra, at Part IV. 
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and even if selective precedent is acceptable, is it proper to make 
only some decisions available to the public? If selective 
transparency is acceptable, who should decide which decisions are 
published and which decisions remain invisible? 
The second assertion is directed at legal scholars. The 
existence of a wide body of invisible appellate adjudication should 
lead legal scholars to scrutinize their methodologies. More 
research should be done to discover the extent of invisible 
decision-making in federal and state courts. Legal scholars need to 
be clear about the limitations they are imposing on their research 
if they only look at cases available through standard research tools. 
If scholars are interested in the impact of law on society at large, 
or in the general behavior of courts, it may make little sense to 
look only at the selective sample of decisions that are available on 
Westlaw or LEXIS, much less only at those that are designated as 
precedents. Empirical legal researchers have long understood this, 
but even in this field prominent studies have often relied on 
Westlaw and LEXIS to collect their data.7 This methodology may 
require re-assessment.  
 In Part II, we establish some baseline terminology about 
unpublished decisions. In Part III, we give an overview of 
practical, real world challenges that led to the increasing 
importance of unpublished decision-making. We report our 
findings in Part IV. In Part V, we address the constitutional 
controversy that this practice has generated. Part VI roots this 
controversy in the history of common law jurisprudential 
philosophy.  We conclude in Part VII. 
 
II. Terminology: Unpublished Decisions and Invisible 
Adjudication 
 
Before going any further, we need to clarify what we are 
talking about. In both judicial and scholarly discussions, the 
terminology of publication and precedent are often used 
synonymously. This can obscure courts’ policies and practices, and 
 
7 See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee Roulette: Disparities in 
Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 405 (2007). 
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can confuse efforts to address concerns that have been raised 
about them. 
Despite the labels “unpublished” and “unreported,”8 some 
circuits began releasing texts of unpublished decisions to Westlaw 
and Lexis in the 1980s.9 In 2001, West Publishing began 
publishing its Federal Appendix, so that there is now a semi-
official reporter for nominally unpublished decisions.10 By 2005, 
texts of unpublished decisions from all federal circuits were 
available on Westlaw and Lexis.11 This development blurred the 
line between published and unpublished decisions.12 But it may 
also have created a false impression that all federal appellate 
decisions are actually publicly available and searchable in standard 
legal research databases.13 That has never been the case. 
A decade ago, David C. Vladeck and Mitu Gulati observed 
that there are three types of decisions in the courts of appeals: 
merits decisions that are published, merits decisions that are 
unpublished, and non-merits decisions in which cases are resolved 
on purely procedural grounds.14 The last category – the non-merits 
decisions – has long been a “black box” about which little is 
revealed, in that the public record of the decision is often limited 
to a one line docket entry.15  
Overall, the federal courts have a system of selective 
publication, and selective precedent, but precedent and 
publication are independent variables. Only some decisions are 
published, and only some published decisions are precedents. But, 
unfortunately, the term “published decision” is widely used to 
 
8 “Unpublished” is often used colloquially by lawyers. Westlaw, by contrast, gives a search option for 
“Reported” or “Unreported” cases. 
9 Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical Problems and Legal 
Malpractice? 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 206 (2006-2007). 
10 See Solomon, supra n. 9, at 207. 
11 See Solomon, supra n. 9, at 206. 
12 Solomon, supra n. 9, at 207. 
13 See, e.g., Hearing on Unpublished Judicial Opinions Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the 
Internet and Intellectual Property, 107th Congress (Statement of J. Alex Kozinski) (“Today, of course, all 
dispositive rulings, whether designated for inclusion in an official reporter or not, are widely available online 
through Westlaw and Lexis, as well as in hard copy in West’s Federal Appendix”) (july 27, 2002); David R. 
Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the Jurisprudentially Unsound UnPublication System, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 685, 
688 (2009) (“Though still labeled ‘unpublished opinions,’ these opinions are published, not only online but 
also in printed volumes.”). 
14 David C. Vladeck and Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 62 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667 (2005).   
15 Vladeck and Gulati, supra n. 14, at 1668. 
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describe precedent decisions, which makes things quite confusing. 
In this essay, we adopt Vladeck and Gulati’s taxonomy, with 
additions. There four relevant categories of decision, not just 
three. As they noted, there are published merits decisions, and 
there are unpublished merits decisions. However, nominally 
unpublished merits cases actually come in two varieties: those that 
are actually available on standard research databases, and those 
that are not. These merits decisions are much like the procedural 
decisions that have long been in a black box.  
The taxonomy of appellate decisions that we propose is as 
follows: 
 
1. Precedent decisions  
2. Non-precedent, visible decisions 
3. Non-precedent, invisible decisions 
4. Non-merits decisions (invisible) 
 
We are adopting the adjective “visible” to describe decision 
that are available and searchable on Westlaw and LEXIS. In a 
literal sense, these decisions are being published, electronically an 
often in bound form. But the legacy of calling non-precedent 
decisions “unpublished” has obscured this literal meaning, and 
thus calls for a new terminology. 
To be clear, in some sense, a document on PACER is 
available to the public. However, PACER is a very different tool 
than LEXIS of Westlaw.16 PACER contains a wealth of data, but 
much of it is sealed, and even the information that is theoretically 
available is difficult to access. We previously studied the impact of 
non-merits decisions on immigration appeals, focusing on how 
long it takes different courts to resolve cases that are decided on 
the merits versus those that are not.17 By analyzing PACER it is 
possible to measure the duration of these cases, since the dates of 
filing are listed.18 But it is not possible to check whether a decision 
 
16 All three tools have the significant disadvantage of a pay wall, which creates a monetary barrier to public 
access to legal information. 
17 See Michael Kagan, Fatma Marouf and Rebecca Gill, Buying Time? False Assumptions About Abusive Appeals, 
63 CATH. U. L. REV. 679 (2014). 
18 Id. 
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to dismiss a petition is correct in the way that one can read and 
critique a published decision on the merits.  
LEXIS and Westlaw are designed to be research tools for 
both practitioners and scholars. By contrast, PACER’s primary 
purpose is as a filing and docket management system for courts. It 
is designed to let parties to litigation file motions and briefs in 
their own cases, not to let people research other people’s cases. 
PACER’s user interface is cumbersome for research purposes.19 
Most important, there is no document-level search function 
whereby one can look for certain legal or factual issues in 
docketed cases.20 In our research, with some finesse, we were able 
to use PACER to identify all of the immigration appeals in each 
circuit court. But it is not possible with PACER to identify cases, 
say, asylum cases involving LGBTQ applicants, or cancellation of 
removal cases that involve caring for an older relative. It is thus 
not an effective tool to find factually or legally similar cases that 
may be pertinent as a potential precedent in a pending case. In this 
way, judicial decisions that cannot be searched in this way might as 
well be invisible for practicing lawyers, as well as for judges trying 
to use past cases to guide their analysis of a new one. In short, 
PACER allows us to prove that many otherwise invisible decisions 
by courts exist. But PACER is also, inadvertently, an ideal means 
of hiding these decision in plain sight.  
Our four-part taxonomy could be subject to further caveats 
and exceptions. One of the most controversial concerns precedent 
decisions. For the most part, precedent decisions are by necessity 
visible and published. It is hard for a decision to be used as a 
precedent by practitioners if it is not available to them. This is why 
the term “published” came to mean precedential. But we have 
learned recently that there are actually secret precedents in the 
realm of national security cases, produced by a federal court under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. We discuss this 
phenomenon in brief in Part III, but the serious implications and 
questions that it raises is not our main focus. Rather, the 
 
19 See The Free Law Project, What is the PACER problem? (2015), https://free.law/2015/03/20/what-is-
the-pacerproblem/). 
20 Id. 
INVISIBLE ADJUDICATION 
 
 
8 
phenomenon of secret precedents highlights the fact that 
precedent and publication are actually two independent variables.  
 Another caveat is that LEXIS and WESTLAW are 
increasingly duplicating data that is available on PACER. What 
this means is that some of the docket reports that one can find for 
PACER can now also be seen on LEXIS and WESTLAW. This 
seems to be a service of convenience for subscribers to these 
commercial research tools; if they know a case number or case 
name, they can look at the docket for the case. But they cannot 
actually see more information than they could on PACER.  
Decisions are not available, and are not searchable.  
 
III. Practical Dimensions 
 
The Emergence of Constructive Ambiguity 
 
The main reason why so many decisions are not published 
is simple practicality. The courts are busy, and it would be difficult 
and expensive. In fact, publication of legal decisions has a long but 
inconsistent history.21 In old English courts, some cases that were 
considered especially important were collected in Yearbooks, but 
lawyers were also permitted to cite reported cases by vouching for 
the existence of the decision.22 In the latter 19th and early 20th 
Centuries, some appellate courts may have been able to publish all 
of their merits decisions as bound reporters developed; these 
reporters now form the backbone of law libraries.23 But it is not 
clear that there was ever a period when all cases in all appellate 
courts were published, and if there was, it did not survive past 
mid-century. 
Since World War II, the federal courts’ dockets have grown 
steadily busier. The increase in the courts’ workload was the 
engine leading to the growth of the modern phenomenon of 
invisible adjudication because it led federal appellate courts to 
 
21 For a useful summary, see Lance A. Wade, Honda Meets Anastasoff: The Procedural Due Process Argument 
Against Rules Prohibited Citation to Unpublished Judicial Decisions, 42 D.C. L. REV. 695, 700-707 (2001). 
22 See Wade, supra n. 21, at 702.  
23 See David R. Cleveland, Draining the Morass: Ending the Jurisprudentially Unsound Unpublication System, 92 
MARQ. L. REV. 685, 696 (2009).  
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increasingly rely on selective publication and selective precedent to 
manage their dockets.24 In 1964, the Judicial Conference of the 
United States recommended that only opinions that had “general 
precedential value” should be published.25 In the 1970s, the 
Judicial Conference of the United States called for the circuit 
courts of appeals to develop “opinion publication plans.”26 
The connection between busier dockets and lower 
publication rates is a simple function of judicial efficiency. Judge 
Alex Kozinski of the Ninth Circuit told Congress, “While an 
unpublished disposition can often be prepared in only a few 
hours, an opinion [published] generally takes many days (often 
weeks, sometimes months) of drafting, editing, polishing and 
revising.”27 Most literature reports that at least three quarters of 
federal court of appeals merits decisions are now designated 
“unpublished.”28 The rates vary considerably by circuit, however, 
with the most extreme circuit publishing less than 10 percent.29 
However, all circuits appear to leave the majority of their decisions 
nominally unpublished.30 As Norman R. Williams wrote, “The 
published written opinion, the hallmark of American appellate 
justice, is now the exception rather than the rule.”31 
 As Williams wrote, the existence of unpublished decisions 
creates a system of superior and inferior decisions, in addition to 
the well-known hierarchy of courts.32 Obvious puzzles result from 
this, such as: What makes for a more persuasive precedent, an 
 
24 See generally Martyha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if they Publish? 44 AM U. L. REV. 757 
(1995). 
25 See Dragich, supra n. 24, at 761. 
26 Williams, supra n. 31, at 770. 
27 Hearing on Unpublished Judicial Opinions Before the House Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and 
Intellectual Property, 107th Cong. (Statement of Judge Alex Kozinski) (June 27, 2002). 
28 Williams, supra n. 1, at 763 (80 percent); Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an 
Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L. J. 621 (2009) (more than three quarters); Deborah Jones Merritt and James J. 
Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 
71, 72 (2001) (more than 80 percent unpublished). See also Beth Zeitlin Shaw, Please Ignore This Case: An 
Empirical Study of Nonprecedential Opionions in the Federal Circuit, 12 GEO MASON L. REV. 1013, 1024-1030 
(2004) (detailed statistics on the growth of unpublished Federal Circuit decisions).  
29 Anika C. Stucky, Building Law, Not Libraries: the Value of Unpublished Opinions and the Effects on Precedent, 59 
OKLA. L. REV. 403, 404 (2006) (reporting 8.2 percent publication rate in the Fourth Circuit, the lowest, and 
42.8 percent in the First Circuit, the highest).  
30 Stucky, supra n. 29, at 404. 
31 Norman R. Williams, The Failings of Originalism: The Federal Courts and Power of Precedent, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 761 (2004). 
32 Williams, supra n. 31, at 774.  
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unpublished decision by an appellate court, or a published 
decision by a district court? Court rules governing unpublished 
cases deal with three related but nevertheless separate questions.33 
First, should courts be allowed in the first place to select only 
some of their decisions to be published?34 Second, should litigants 
be allowed to cite non-precedent (unpublished) cases in their 
arguments, when such decisions are in fact available.35 Third, can 
an unpublished case, if it is known to the parties and to the court, 
be considered a precedent of any kind?36 To these three questions, 
we would add a fourth: Is it proper for courts to issue decisions 
that are not made available to the public at all, absent a compelling 
reason why the cases needs to remain confidential? 
 For awhile, the lower courts’ approaches to these questions 
generated a brewing crisis. The trend, through 2005, was for 
courts to ban parties from citing nominally unpublished cases, 
even though many such decisions were increasingly available on 
standard legal research databases.37 If parties are not allowed to 
cite a decision, courts need not wrestle with the question of 
whether that decision has any relevance in a new case. But this of 
course requires litigants and judges to treat factually similar 
decisions by the same court as a kind of elephant in the room – 
something that is probably quite pertinent, but that cannot be 
spoken of.  Competent lawyers, judges and judicial clerks working 
on a pending case would know that an otherwise analogous case 
had already been decided, but they would not be allowed to talk 
about it.  
By 2004-2005, the non-publication system was the subject 
of serious controversy, resulting in congressional hearings and at 
least a momentary circuit split. The Eighth Circuit decided, 
initially, that refusing to consider an unpublished decision as a 
precedent would violate the vesting clause in Article III of the 
Constitution, under which “The judicial power of the United 
States, shall be vested” in the Supreme Court and the inferior 
 
33 Williams, supra n. 31, at 768. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Williams, supra n. 31, at 765. 
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federal courts established by Congress.38 An Eighth Circuit panel 
reasoned that the power to decide the law inherently carries 
precedential authority.39 In other words, the Court of Appeals 
could not constitutionally issue non-precedent decisions. 
However, one year later the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit found that precedent was not meant to be a rigid concept 
in the Constitution.40 The Eighth Circuit later vacated its decision, 
as we will discuss in more detail in Part V.41  
This controversy was diffused by the issuance of a new 
rule.42 In 2006, the Supreme Court amended the Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Under the new Rule 32.1, which took effect 
in 2007,  “A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of 
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written 
dispositions that have been [ ] designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for 
publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not precedent,’ or the like.” The 
new rule does not clarify if unpublished opinions have 
precedential value, or if it is even proper for courts to designate 
certain opinions as non-precedents.43  
Another problem with the current system is the fact that 
decisions are inconsistently available through standard research 
tools. This means that litigants may have unequal access to potent 
legal authority.44 Consider that in administrative law setting, the 
Department of Justice could theoretically have access to every case 
through its internal systems, since it serves as the government’s 
law firm in all of them. Private parties would not have this access, 
and thus could be disadvantaged if unpublished decisions start to 
have more influence in litigation. Nevertheless, this new system 
has survived through constructive ambiguity. It is now permissible 
to tell courts about unpublished cases, but it is not clear if courts 
must follow them as precedents. This introduces a significant 
 
38 U.S. Const. Art. III. 
39 Williams, supra n. 31, at 781. 
40 Williams, supra n. 31, at 785. 
41 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir 2000) en banc. 
42 See Patrick J. Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 23 (2005) (explaining reasons for the revision of the rule). 
43 See Scott E. Grant, Missing the Forest for a Tree: Unpublished Opinions and New Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
32.1, 47 B.C. L. REV. 705 (2006). 
44 See Andrew T. Solomon, Making Unpublished Opinions Precedential: A Recipe for Ethical Problems and Legal 
Malpractice? 26 MISS. C. L. REV. 185, 203 (2006-2007). 
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degree of unpredictability into the system. Litigants have little 
guidance about whether a previous, nominally unpublished 
decision will be predictive of future decisions. Attorneys are left to 
guess or rely on anecdotal experience with individual judges to 
decide how much to stress unpublished decisions in their briefs. 
And attorneys (as well as scholars) are forced to rely on 
incomplete data about past decisions to predict how the courts 
might behavior in future cases. 
 
Selecting Precedents 
 
While much remains ambiguous, a hierarchy remains 
between published and unpublished cases, which means it is 
important to know how courts decide which cases to designate as 
“published.” For example, the rule in the largest federal appellate 
circuit establishes three categories of decisions: Opinions (which is 
a “written, reasoned disposition” intended for publication), 
Memoranda (which are similar, but “not intended for 
publication”) and Orders, which are “any other disposition.”45 The 
circuit’s rules state that a decision should be published as an 
Opinions if it meets one of seven alternative criteria: 
 
 
1. Establishes, alters, modifies or clarifies a rule 
of federal law, or 
 
2. Calls attention to a rule of law that appears to 
have been generally overlooked, or 
 
3. Criticizes existing law, or 
 
4. Involves a legal or factual issue of unique 
interest or substantial public importance, or 
 
5. Is a disposition of a case in which there is a 
published opinion by a lower court or administrative 
 
45 Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure (FRAP), Ninth Circuit Rules, R. 36.1. 
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agency, unless the panel determines that publication 
is unnecessary for clarifying the panel’s disposition of 
the case, or 
 
6. Is a disposition of a case following a reversal 
or remand by the United States Supreme Court, or 
 
7. Is accompanied by a separate concurring or 
dissenting expression, and the author of such 
separate expression requests publication of the 
disposition of the Court and the separate 
expression.46 
 
Only the last three of these criteria are straightforward in their 
application. The first four are inherently ambiguous, and raise 
weighty philosophical problems, as we will explore more in Part 
VI. 
Beyond the criteria for publication that courts include in 
their rules, some empirical studies suggest that other factors have 
an impact. The personality of judges appears to make a difference, 
so that certain judges are more likely to participate in publication 
than others.47 Empirical research on why this may be is limited, 
though suggestive. For instance, a study of labor law cases found 
that the gender of judges did not seems to correlate to publication 
rates, meaning that men and women seem equally inclined to seek 
to have their opinions published.48 But that study found that 
judicial panels including “more graduates of elite law schools were 
significantly more likely to publish their opinions, after controlling 
for other factors.”49 Some studies have wondered whether non-
publication might be more likely if the court rules for one type of 
party rather than another, but the evidence seems mixed. In 
immigration cases, at least those involving an asylum application, 
judges appear more likely to publish their decision if they rule in 
 
46 Id., R. 36.3 
47 See Donald Songer, Criteria for Publication of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules Versus 
Empirical Reality, 73 JUDICATURE 307, 312-313 (1990); Merritt and Brudney, supra n. 28, at 95-97.  
48 Merritt and Brudney, supra n. 28, at 97. 
49 Merritt and Brudney, supra n. 28, at 95. 
INVISIBLE ADJUDICATION 
 
 
14 
favor of granting asylum.50 But in labor law cases involving the 
National Labor Relations Board, publication did no correlate with 
the court being more likely to rule for the employer or for the 
union.51 
 
 
IV. Our Findings: Invisible Adjudication in Immigration 
Cases 
 
 There are eleven circuit courts of appeals that regularly 
decide immigration cases.52 In a previous study, we developed a 
database of 1646 randomly selected immigration cases filed 
between April 2009 and 2012 from each of these circuits.53 These 
cases were drawn from the PACER docketing system, and thus 
are unfiltered by the court or by research database. The sample 
thus includes the full gamut of immigration appeals to the circuit 
courts – known as petitions for review. Many of these cases end 
on purely procedural grounds, such as failure to pay a fee or 
failure to file a brief. Others end voluntarily, when the petitioner 
asks to withdraw the case, or the petitioner and the Department of 
Justice mutually agree to a remand. In these circumstances there 
naturally is no judicially issued opinion on the case. Thus, for 
purposes of the present analysis, we focused on a narrower subset 
of cases that the courts ultimately decided, either on the merits or 
on jurisdictional grounds.54 With these limitations, we had a 
sample of cases from each of the circuits, as listed in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 David S. Law, Strategic Judicial Lawmaking: Ideology, Publication, and Asylum Law in the Ninth Circuit, 73 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 817 (2005). 
51 Merritt and Brudney, supra n. 28, at 99. 
52 The D.C. Circuit and the Federal Circuit do not normally have jurisdiction of immigration cases. 
53 Fatma Marouf, Michael Kagan, Rebecca Gill, Justice on the Fly: The Danger of Errant Deportations, 75 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 337 (2014). The date range was determined based on the original focus of that study, which was the 
impact of the Supreme Court’s decision in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). 
54 PACER dockets do not always give access to the judgment, but they do indicate generally whether the a 
denial was based on jurisdiction or on procedural grounds. 
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FIGURE 1: Sample Sizes 
 
 
1st 
Cir 
2d 
Cir 
3d 
Cir 
4th 
Cir 
5th 
Cir 
6th 
Cir 
7th 
Cir 
9th 
Cir 
9th 
Cir 
10th 
Cir 
11th 
Cir 
Merits 
Decisions 
(grants and 
denials) 
 93 56 78 113 64 84 72 80 74 65 99 
Jurisdiction 
Denials 20 7 22 11 43 19 19 20 32 22 31 
 
 
 This sampling allows us to clearly see differences between 
the circuits. However, it does not directly allow us to report a 
national average because some circuits hear many more 
immigration cases than others, and our sample does not represent 
them proportionately.55 We kept denials based on jurisdiction 
separate in our analysis because they might seem ambiguous with 
regards to the merits of judges producing a reasoned decision. 
Depending on the situation, jurisdiction might seem clear-cut and 
nearly mechanical, but it can also lead to ambiguous legal 
questions. 
 We next examined whether Westlaw and LexisNexis 
databases include a listing of the cases. In other words, we 
examined whether a researcher relying solely on these research 
tools could discover that the case exists, regardless of whether she 
could actually access a decision to read. The answer was, generally, 
yes, albeit with a significant caveat. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
55 The Ninth Circuit hears the most – as much as 47 percent of all immigration appeals. See Kagan, Marouf, 
Gill, supra n. 17 at 690 FN 60. The Second Circuit received the second most. Id. at 705. 
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FIGURE 2 
 
 
 
For most circuits, Westlaw and Lexis have a feature that includes 
the same docket records that are available on PACER. Obviously, 
as our data show, this was not the case for the Second Circuit. But 
it means that for the other ten circuits, a researcher could find the 
case – but only if the researcher knew how to look for it. We 
confirmed that the case was listed by entering the docket number, 
which we already knew from having found the case in PACER 
previously. However, much like PACER, this feature is not useful 
for normal legal research because it does not allow a text-based 
search for cases dealing with particular facts or legal issues. 
 Our primary interest was in whether the actual judicial 
decision is available to a researcher. We entered each case in our 
database into Westlaw and Lexis using the unique docket number 
to find out. The results are depicted here in Figures 3 and 4: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1st	Cir	 2d	Cir	 3d	Cir	 4th	Cir	 5th	Cir	 6th	Cir	 7th	Cir	 9th	Cir	 9th	Cir	 10th	Cir	
11th	
Cir	
Westlaw:	Docket	Listed		 100%	 0%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	
Lexis:	Docket	Listed	 100%	 7%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	 100%	
0%	
20%	
40%	
60%	
80%	
100%	
Merits	Decisions:	Docket	Lis/ngs	
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FIGURE 3 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 
 
 
 
The first and most obvious observation to make about this 
data is that LexisNexis has made significant strides toward 
1st	Cir	 2d	Cir	 3d	Cir	 4th	Cir	 5th	Cir	 6th	Cir	 7th	Cir	 9th	Cir	 9th	Cir	 10th	Cir	
11th	
Cir	
Westlaw:	Decision	Available	 0%	 0%	 0%	 1%	 2%	 0%	 1%	 0%	 1%	 0%	 0%	
Lexis:	Decision	Available	 22%	 7%	 95%	 85%	 78%	 39%	 93%	 79%	 53%	 100%	 86%	
0%	
20%	
40%	
60%	
80%	
100%	
Merits	Decisions:	Decision	
Availability	
1st	Cir	 2d	Cir	 3d	Cir	 4th	Cir	 5th	Cir	 6th	Cir	 7th	Cir	 9th	Cir	 9th	Cir	 10th	Cir	
11th	
Cir	
Westlaw:	Decision	Available	 0%	 0%	 0%	 0%	 0%	 0%	 5%	 0%	 0%	 0%	 0%	
Lexis:	Decision	Available	 10%	 0%	 36%	 73%	 26%	 11%	 63%	 35%	 13%	 86%	 16%	
0%	
20%	
40%	
60%	
80%	
100%	
Jurisdic/onal	Denials:	Decision	
Availability	
INVISIBLE ADJUDICATION 
 
 
18 
including otherwise unpublished decisions. Westlaw, by contrast, 
includes almost now. It is not clear that a user of Westlaw would 
know this however, which presents a problem that we return to in 
out Conclusion.  
Even looking solely at Lexis, there are large numbers of 
immigration appeals that are decided on the merits and which are 
unavailable to the public, to practicing lawyers, and to researchers. 
The Ninth Circuit alone regularly receives nearly 3000 immigration 
appeals a year.56 Thus, if even a third were not included – and that 
appears to be the case – there are hundreds of decisions that are 
essentially invisible. More specifically, these decisions are 
unsearchable. 
 Before going further, it should be clear that what is true 
for immigration cases might not be true for all cases. Certain 
aspects of immigration adjudication might make invisible 
adjudication more common with immigration cases than other 
federal litigation. One reason to suspect this may be the case is the 
sheer number of cases. Another reason why immigration appeals 
may be different is procedural. Removal cases are administrative; 
they start in Immigration Court and are first appealed to the Board 
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), both of which sit within the 
Department of Justice.57 Only after a final order of removal is 
issued by the BIA may a petition for review be filed to a circuit 
court of appeals.58 This means that for the federal judiciary, 
immigration cases skip the usual first instance courts – the district 
courts. In theory, this need not change the role of the court of 
appeals. The Court of Appeals will review findings of fact by 
administrative tribunals by a deferential standard.59 But it is still 
possible that the courts of appeals have relatively less confidence 
in the system of administrative immigration adjudication than they 
do in federal district courts. They might therefore feel that they 
need to resolve basic questions that would normally not be 
brought to a federal court, since the appellate court is actually the 
 
56 See Kagan, Marouf, Gill, supra n. 17 at 690 FN 60. 
57 See generally, 8 C.F.R. § 1003 (setting out the composition and functions of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals). 
58 8 U.S.C. § 1252. 
59 See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1, 484 (1992) (using the substantial evidence standard in 
federal court review of factual questions in an asylum case). 
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first Article III federal court to consider the case. This is merely a 
theoretical possibility; we do not know that this is actually 
happening.  
While it is difficult to generalize across all areas of federal 
litigation, the widespread phenomenon of unsearchable, truly 
unavailable decisions in immigration cases alone raises significant 
jurisprudential concerns. Immigration appeals now take up an 
extremely large portion of Courts of Appeals dockets.60 They are 
inherently high stakes, and they concern one of the most 
controversial subjects in our legal and political system.  
  
V. The Constitutional Dimension 
 
The existence of widespread invisible adjudication evokes 
comparisons to secret adjudication, a concern that has attracted 
recent concern in relation to the Federal Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) court.61 As in the immigration cases we study, the 
FISA court involves federal judges making high stakes decisions 
on issues of public concern, with the decisions being inaccessible 
and hidden from lawyers who do not work for certain federal 
agencies, and from the general public. But there are some 
differences. One is the motivation of invisibility. FISA decisions 
are deliberately made secret because they involve national security. 
Unpublished immigration decisions are invisible as a matter of 
convenience, resulting from large appellate dockets clogging the 
system.  
Another important difference concerns stare decisis. In 
immigration cases, and in normal litigation, a case would become 
unpublished, and potentially invisible, only if it has been 
designation as a non-precedent by the court. But the FISA court 
issues precedent decisions that are nevertheless secret.62 This is a 
challenge to core assumptions that we usually make about law 
being published and transparent, so that all can know in advance 
 
60 See Marouf, Kagan, Gill, supra n 53, at 339. 
61 See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., THE NEW YORK TIMES (July 6, 2013). 
62 Lichtblau, supra n. 61. See also Jack Booglin and Julius Taranto, Comment: Stare Decisis and Secret Law: On 
Precedent and Publication in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 124 YALE. L.J. 2189 (2015). 
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about the rules that govern society.63 As we will see in Part VI, 
early philosophers of Anglo-American law, especially Jeremy 
Bentham, argued that establishing and protecting public 
expectations is a central purpose of law. Secret law by definition 
cannot accomplish this.64 In this respect, it would be an 
improvement for the FISA court to not allow any of its secret 
decisions to set precedent, thus making them more like regular 
unpublished opinions. But this depends on the assumption that 
only precedent-setting, law-making decisions are of interest to the 
public. That is a contestable premise. The lack of public 
knowledge about FISA decisions is only one problem. As others 
have written, lack of publication also reduces incentives for judges 
to write well-reasoned decision that can withstand public 
scrutiny.65 Stare decisis is not just a means of making law; it is a 
means of promoting judicial stability and restraint by holding 
judges accountable, making arbitrary actions that depart from 
precedent visible to all.66  
The practice designating only some appellate decisions to 
be published precedent developed in response to the practical 
realities of burgeoning court dockets. But what is clearly 
convenient is not necessarily constitutional. While courts have 
continued the practice, they have been unable to entirely shed the 
constitutional doubt that hangs over it. The fact that many non-
precedential decisions are actually invisible using standard research 
tools is likely to increase these doubts.  
The most visible spark for the constitutional critique of 
non-precedent was the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Anastasoff v. 
United States. In 2000, Faye Anastasoff brought a tax dispute with 
the IRS to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.67 The 
primary legal question was about the mailbox rule. Ms. Anastasoff 
mailed a refund claim two days before the deadline; it arrived at 
the IRS one day after the deadline. The question presented was 
 
63 See Booglin and Taranto, supra n. 62, at 2189 (“the fundamental problem with the FDISA court’s work is 
that judge-made law can be generated only through stare decisis, a doctrine that we argue is not justified 
when applied to secret decisions.”). 
64 See Booglin and Taranto, supra n. 62, at 2196 (arguing that law should be standard and knowable, echoing 
arguments made by Bentham). 
65 Booglin and Taranto, supra n. 62, at 2194. 
66 Booglin and Taranto, supra n. 62, at 2196. 
67 Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898 (8th Cir. 2000). 
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whether she was late under applicable statutory provisions.68 Ms. 
Anastasoff argued that the mailbox rule should apply, which 
would mean she could get her refund. This was an unresolved 
question for the Court of Appeal – if one looked only at its 
designated precedent decisions. But in reality this was not the first 
time the Eighth Circuit court had confronted this precise question 
about the mailbox rule in tax law. Eight years earlier, another 
taxpayer, in Christie v. United States, made a similar claim, and had 
lost.69 But Christie had been a per curiam decision that had been 
designated unpublished, which under the court’s rules at the time 
meant that it could not be used as a precedent.70 Naturally, Ms. 
Anastasoff wanted to make sure that Christie remained a non-
precendent. Thus, a case about a fairly tedious procedural question 
in tax law turned into a battle over how modern American 
appellate courts work.  
The Court of Appeals issued a bombshell decision: 
 
Although it is our only case directly in point, Ms. 
Anastasoff contends that we are not bound by 
Christie because it is an unpublished decision and 
thus not a precedent under 8th Circuit Rule 28A(i). 
We disagree. We hold that the portion of Rule 
28A(i) that declares that unpublished opinions are 
not precedent is unconstitutional under Article III, 
because it purports to confer on the federal courts 
a power that goes beyond the ``judicial.''71 
 
To support this decision, Judge Richard Arnold conducted 
a lengthy analysis of the history of judicial precedent at the time of 
the framing. The crux of his argument hung on two key premises. 
First, “inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and 
interpretation of a general principle or rule of law.” In other 
words, it is false to assume that courts can distinguish cases that 
should be used as precedents from those that cannot. This is a 
 
68 223 F. 3d at 899.  
69 223 F.3d at 899. 
70 See Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 899 
71 223 F.3d at 899. 
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contention that echoes a debate in legal philosophy about whether 
there is any real difference between “easy” and “hard” cases, a 
question we explore further below in Part VI. The second premise 
was that there could be no room for making one-off decisions.72 
Quoting Blackstone’s Commentaries, Judge Arnold wrote that rules 
of law had to be “permanent” because “a judge is ‘sworn to 
determine, not according to his own judgments, but according to 
the known laws. [Judges are] not delegated to pronounce a new 
law, but to maintain and expound the old.’”73 To designate a 
decision non-precedential  “would allow us to avoid the 
precedential effect of our prior decisions.”74 Since a decision that 
sets no precedent could not be considered a decision of law, it 
went beyond the “judicial” power established by Article III of the 
Constitution.75  
 Anastasoff was a shock, and much was written about it.76 It 
threatened a fundamental feature of modern court administration 
and might have radically changed how the federal appellate courts 
work. But it was also effectively a decision against interest. 
Whenever a litigant challenges a court’s own rules, the court has 
an inherent conflict of interest. Courts have an inherent conflict of 
interest when considering whether their own rules are 
constitutional. That is especially so when the rule that is 
challenged seems important to the way judges want to organize 
their work. To tell a judicial panel that every decision must be a 
precedent may be the functional equivalent of telling judges: You 
need to work much, much harder. This made the Anastasoff 
decision even more remarkable.  
 The revolution did not last long, however. Not surprisingly 
given the magnitude of the holding, Anastasoff sought a rehearing 
by an en banc panel. Perhaps sensing that more was at stake than 
the mailbox rule, the IRS decided to simply pay Ms. Anastasoff 
 
72 223 F.3d at 901. 
73 Id. (quoting Blackstone). 
74 223 F.3d at 900. 
75 Id. 
76 See, e.g., William J. Miller, Chipping Away at the Dam: Anastasoff v. United States and the Future of Unpublished 
Opinions in the United States Courts of Appeals and Beyond, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 181 (2001); Steven A. Fredley, 
Anastasoff v. United States: Nonprecedential Precedent, Judicial Power, and Due Process: A Case for Maintaining the Status 
Quo, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 127 (2001); Douglas E. Cressler and Paula F. Cardoza, A New Era Dawns in 
Appellate Procedure, 34 IND. L. REV. 741 (2001). 
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her refund, and asked the court to vacate the decision as moot.77 
The en banc court agreed.78 As a result, there is no binding decision 
from a Court of Appeals holding that our system of unpublished 
decisions is unconstitutional.  And yet, Judge Arnold’s analysis was 
not reversed on the merits either. 79  
In the 2004-2006 period when Congress held hearings on 
unpublished decision rules and the Supreme Court ultimately 
revised the FRAP, Anastasoff became the spring board for law 
review articles arguing against unpublished opinions.80 The articles 
expanded the constitutional objections. Not only was the notion 
of a non-precedential decision a violation of the vesting clause in 
Article III. It also might violate procedural due process.81 Yet, 
despite the enthusiasm of some scholars, two circuits directly 
rejected Judge Arnold’s decision in Anastasoff. The most 
prominent was a lengthy opinion by the Ninth Circuit’s Judge 
Kozinski in Hart v. Massanari in 2001.82 Judge Kozinski became a 
leading proponent of unpublished decisions, later giving testimony 
to Congress that we have quoted from in this Article. If Anastasoff 
represented one extremity of this debate, Hart represents the 
opposite extreme. The Ninth Circuit did not just affirm a refusal 
to consider unpublished cases as precedents. It held that an 
attorney could be sanctioned for having cited a case that was easily 
accessible on Westlaw and LEXIS.83  
 Judge Kozinski offered a number of rebuttals to Judge 
Arnold. As a matter of constitutional law, he questioned whether 
the vesting of judicial power in federal courts in Article III was 
actually a limitation on judicial power.84 This attacked an essential 
 
77 Anastasoff v. United States, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
78 Id. at 1056. 
79 In 2003, a different Eighth Circuit judge referred to it in a concurring opinion, indicating that the 
constitutional argument still had merit. See United States v. Yirkovsky, 338 F.3d 936, 945 (8th Cir. 2003) (J. 
Heaney, dissenting) (expressing doubt about whether the circuit’s unpublished decision rule was 
constitutional). 
80 See, e.g., Erica S. Weisgerber, Unpublished Opinions: A Convenient Means to an Unconstitutional End, 97 GEO. L.J. 
621 (2009); Dragich, supra n. 24; Wade, supra n. 21. 
81 See Wade, supra n. 21. Moreover, the pre-2006 rules that prohibited litigants from even citing unpublished 
decisions might violate the First Amendment. 
82 Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2001). 
83 Id. at 1159 (noting that the Ninth Circuit rule went farther than the Eighth Circuit rule because the Ninth 
Circuit prohibited citation); Id. at 1180 (declining to impose sanctions, although they would be 
constitutional, because the Anastasoff decision had produced doubt about the rule). 
84 Id. at 1161. 
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premise of Anastasoff, but it is beyond the scope of this Article. Of 
greater interest here is the connection Judge Kozinski saw 
between systems of publication and precedent. He argued that 
precedent at the time of the framing was actually a more flexible 
concept than it is today.85  The lynchpin of this argument is the 
premise that today we understand a precedent to be binding on 
later courts, while until at least the 19th Century English judges 
declared the law, but could not make the law.86 Echoing 
Blackstone, a single decision should not be rigidly binding because 
a single judge in a single case could be wrong.87 In Judge 
Kozinski’s view, at the framing of the Constitution, individual 
cases were less important than the combined force of many 
examples of past practice – but judges still retained the authority 
to discard examples with which they disagreed.88 
 As Judge Kozinski and his Ninth Circuit colleagues saw it, 
our modern system of more rigid precedent forces courts to be 
more careful about what they consider to be a precedent. He 
wrote, “Designating an opinion as binding circuit authority is a 
weighty decision that cannot be taken lightly, because its effects 
are not easily reversed.”89 What is interesting in Judge Kozinski’s 
analysis is that he seems to not rely on the criteria that are stressed 
in his own court’s rules, which we have quoted above in Part III. 
He does not focus on whether the merits of the case raise unique 
issues or have the potential to change or clarify the law. Instead, 
he focuses on the amount of effort judges are able to devote to 
the decision, because he is first an foremost concerned that the 
judges might make a mistake. Judge Kozinski seems concerned 
that the cases are hard, and thus a precedent should only be set 
when a court is able to consider an issue with the care that it 
deserves.90 The first panel to consider an issue might not get it 
right, even though by definition the first case decided on a 
 
85 Id. at 1163. 
86 Id. at 1165 
87 Id. 
88 Id. (“Common law judges looked to earlier cases only as examples of policy or practice, and a single case 
was generally not binding authority. Eighteenth-century judges did not feel bound to follow most decisions 
that might lead to inconvenient results, and judges would even blame reporters for cases they disliked.”) 
89 Id. at 1172. 
90 See Id. at 1170-1171, 1177 (noting that courts only have the resources to craft precedent decisions in some 
of the cases that come before them). 
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particular question of law would be likely to establish a new rule of 
law. By analogy, Judge Kozinski argues that circuit courts’ 
distinction between precedent and non-precedent decisions serves 
a similar purpose to the Supreme Court’s practice of only granting 
cert to a small number of cases, on which it can produce fully 
considered opinions.91 
 In 2002, the Federal Circuit followed the Ninth Circuit’s 
lead in Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, a patent case 
raising the question of whether the equitable doctrine of 
prosecution laches could bar patent enforcement. 92 The Federal 
Circuit had previously rejected the laches doctrine in two 
unpublished patent cases.93 Like Judge Kosinski of the Ninth 
Circuit, the Federal Circuit argued that at the time of the framing 
the system of common law precedent did not require every case to 
be reported, noting that Sir Francis Bacon had advised King James 
I to omit from case reports decisions that were “merely iteration 
and repetition.”94 But as in the Ninth Circuit decision, this 
reasoning blurred the distinction between unpublished and non-
precedential.95 Moreover, it is one thing to say that cases that 
merely reiterate established rules can be considered non-
precedents. But that does not explain – and the Federal Circuit 
made no effort to explain – why it designated as non-precedential 
its only on point decisions on the laches doctrine in the patent 
context. Clearly these were not reiterations of a rule. That is why 
so much depended on whether they could be treated as 
precedents. 
 The constitutional doubts have never entirely receded. The 
two circuit decisions rejecting Anastasoff were published from the 
revision of the new rule allowing citation to nominally 
unpublished decisions. This adds lingering ambiguity around the 
questions. In the Ninth Circuit’s Hart decision, the holding was 
that a lawyer could be sanctioned for doing something that is now 
explicitly allowed. Judge Arnold’s critique of non-precedential 
 
91 Id. at 1177. 
92 Symbol Technologies, Inc. v. Lemelson Medical, 277 F.3d 1361, 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
93 Id. at 1365. 
94 Id. at 1367. 
95 Id. at 1368 (“Unpublished, or as this court calls them, nonprecedential decisions …”). 
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decision-makings still pops up periodically, especially when 
litigants find that the non-precedent status of a past decision hurts 
their cause. For example, in 2007, the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit avoided ruling directly on an Anastasoff-like 
challenge to a state court’s non-precedent rule by dismissing a suit 
on standing grounds.96  
In 2016, Judge Costa on the Fifth Circuit appeared to 
endorse Anastasoff in a dissent.97 The case at hand concerned 
whether a Georgia “aggravated assault” conviction was for a 
“crime of violence” as defined in federal immigration and 
sentencing law, a legal question that has generated a great deal of 
litigation in recent years. A series of unpublished decision by the 
court had found that Georgia “aggravated assault” was indeed a 
crime of violence.98 The two-judge majority of the court found 
that these cases were not precedential, but “may be considered 
persuasive.”99 It then proceeded to offer several pages of detailed 
textual analysis of the unpublished cases, much as a court would 
have in deciding whether to apply a rule from a precedential, 
published decision.100 This extensive examination of cases that 
nominally were not binding precedents formed a backdrop for 
Judge Costa’s dissent: 
 
The strong interest in uniform application of the law 
means that we should usually follow unpublished 
decisions. But the difference between published and 
unpublished decisions must mean something. 
Otherwise, we should just “publish” everything and 
give all opinions the weight of binding authority.101 
 
The point of this, it would seem, is that judges could in practice 
treat non-precedent decisions the same as they would precedents, 
the false distinction would do no more than introduce a new 
source of apparent arbitrariness to the process.  
 
96 Smith v. Mullarkey, 484 F.3d 1282 (10th Cir 2007). 
97 United States v. Torres-Jaime, 821 F.3d 577, 586 (5th Cir 2016) (J. Costa, dissenting). 
98 821 F.3d at 582 (listing unpublished decisions). 
99 Id.  
100 See Id. at 582-585. 
101 821 F.3d at 586 (J. Costa, dissenting). 
INVISIBLE ADJUDICATION 
 
 
 
27 
DRAFT – SUBJECT TO REVISION 
 
Judge Costa made an additional point. He noted Judge 
Arnold’s contention that non-precedential decision-making invited 
inconsistent decision-making.102 To this, Judge Costa took a 
different approach:  
 
This case does not require fleshing out the full 
contours of when the desire for consistency that 
should ordinarily lead us to follow unpublished 
decisions should give way to the interest in getting 
the law right. For it involves a situation in which a 
departure from nonprecedential authority should not 
be controversial: when a key legal premise of those 
unpublished decisions is revealed to be demonstrably 
false. That is the case here with respect to our prior, 
unpublished rulings which incorrectly assumed that 
the Georgia assault statute requires intentionally 
causing apprehension of violent injury.103 
 
Judge Costa’s revisiting of the Anastasoff debates is interesting in 
that it comes after the FRAP revisions. Unlike the Ninth Circuit 
and Federal Circuit panels, he considered unpublished opinions at 
a time when it was clear that litigants may cite them. The majority 
opinion from which he dissented illustrates the ambiguities of this 
new era. Unpublished decisions can no longer be ignored; lawyers 
can no longer be sanctioned for talking about them. And judges 
may be tempted to analyze them in considerable depth. What then 
is the point of calling them unpublished? 
In response to these questions, Judge Costa argued that 
judges’ should just try to get the law right, not just follow 
precedent rigidly. Rather than argue over whether a past decision 
can be considered a precedent, judges should instead ask if the 
past cases were correctly decided. When judges want to cite 
extensively to a past decision, it is probably because they find its 
analysis compelling, and that really should be the point. As we will 
see in Part VI, this is in line with what Blackstone argued should 
 
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
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be the role of the judge. Precedent is evidence of the law, not the 
law itself. But while another writer might see this a good reason to 
not insist on publishing every decision, Judge Costa saw it as a 
reason to minimize the difference between published and 
unpublished cases. All of them might inform decision-making in a 
present case, and any past decision might be discarded as a 
precedent if it turns out to have been wrongly decided. But this 
would of course require a weaker adherence to precedent than we 
often take for granted. 
There is another lingering problem signaled by Anastasoff, 
Hart and the more recent Fifth Circuit case. Even assuming the 
propriety of the present system, are courts doing a poor job of 
designating which of their decisions should be precedential? In 
each of these cases, litigants confronted a situation in which the 
only on point decisions were designated non-precedents. The 
decisions clearly addressed an unresolved question, and had value 
in guiding future adjudications. They were not mere reiterations of 
a well-established rule. So why then were they not designated as 
precedents in the first place? As we will see in Part VI, this 
question touches on longstanding debates in legal philosophy, 
especially whether “hard” and “easy” cases can meaningfully be 
separated. 
In this ambiguous constitutional context, the existence of 
invisible adjudication may be quite destabilizing. The core critique 
of non-precedent is that courts will be tempted to behave 
arbitrarily. Since not every decision sets a precedent for the future, 
it is easier in theory for courts to make one-off decisions. But 
transparency may mitigate against this risk. 104 While decisions may 
not be binding, if judges become nakedly inconsistently in their 
decision-making, they can be publicly critiqued. Since non-
precedent decisions can now be cited, litigants can warn judges in 
advance that an adverse decision will appear to be arbitrary. 
Transparency may conceivably restrain judges from straying too 
far, and may mitigate constitutional doubts enough to allow the 
system to continue. But if it turns out – as our data suggests – that 
 
104 Cf. Kozinski, supra n. 27 (arguing that there is no sign of court deviance from established rules, and that 
decisions are available to the public).  
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this transparency is a myth, the dangers of judicial arbitrariness 
seems considerably more acute.  
 
VI. Philosophical Dimensions 
 
The premise that judges can decide cases without setting a 
precedent for the future, without disseminating their reasoning, 
and sometimes without even writing down an explanation for the 
decision, highlights longstanding problems within Anglo-
American legal theory. The nut of the problem can be traced to 
18th Century disagreements between William Blackstone and 
Jeremy Bentham. Had Bentham been more influential in 
American law, it would be difficult to see a place for unpublished 
decisions today. The fact that unpublished decisions are routine 
owes a great deal to the fact that Blackstone had more influence in 
this country. 
Bentham generally favored codification of law, preferring 
legislation over the common law approach.105 For him, legislation 
would be the preferred route to legal reform. He wrote at a time 
when statutes were far less prominent in resolving routine legal 
disputes than they are today, and so in a sense the legal world has 
moved in his direction to a significant extent.106 On the other side, 
Blackstone famously defended the incremental approach of the 
common law, which frustrated Bentham’s ambitions for more 
rapid legal reform.107 Not surprising for a critic of the common 
law, Bentham distrusted lawyers and judges, and wanted to limit 
the powers of the latter.108 But for present purposes, Bentham’s 
most important argument about the role of judges concerned the 
predictability of the law, regardless of whether the law was judge-
made or codified by a legislature. Stemming from his utilitarian 
orientation, Bentham argued that the object of law should be to 
 
105 See Dean Alfange, Jr., Jeremy Bentham and the Codification of Law, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 58, 70-71 (1969) 
(“Nothing not in the Code would have force of law.”). 
106 See Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J. L & ECON. 569 (1976). 
107 See generally Richard A. Posner, Blackstone and Bentham, 19 J. L. & Econ. 569, 593-597 (1976). 
108 See Alfange, supra n. 105, at 58, 70-71 (even when legislation proved unclear, Bentham preferred to refer 
questions back to the legislature rather than rely on judges to interpret). 
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protect individual expectations, which required that law be both 
cognizable and accessible.109 As a means to protect expectations, 
Bentham advocated strict adherence to stare decisis as a check on 
judges.110 By contrast, Blackstone was comfortable with judges 
occasionally making exceptions and creating legal fictions in order 
to avoid an inequitable outcome that would result from strict 
application of existing rules in a particular case.111 
The Blackstone-Bentham disagreement can be understood 
in part as a disagreement about whether politicians or judges are 
the greater threat. Blackstone had inherited his faith in judges 
from Sir Edward Coke, who is often credited with establishing the 
concept of precedent that we still use today. Working a few 
decades before Blackstone, Coke promoted precedent as a means 
to restrain the King from hearing and deciding legal cases on his 
own.112 Coke believed that precedent restrained arbitrary action, 
but also required a decision-maker who was well-versed in the 
accumulated body of common law.113 By this two pronged 
argument, Coke used the concept of precedent both to limit 
arbitrary decision-making, while also shifting power from the King 
to the judiciary, where expertise in the common law resided.114 For 
him, the virtue of the common law was that it is complicated, and 
thus required experts. Bentham disliked it for essentially the same 
reason.  
Differences in how much trust various thinkers are willing 
to place in lawyers and judges has a great deal to do with how they 
might think about non-publication of judicial decisions. To 
understand the legitimacy of judges deciding not to publicize their 
decision in ostensibly minor cases, it is essential to understand 
what role such cases play in formation of the law. Blackstone and 
Bentham offered different answers to this question. For 
Blackstone, common law judges should be bound to rules, not to 
precedents.115 Precedent decisions are the best evidence of the 
 
109 See Alfange, supra n. 105, at 65. 
110 See GERALD J. POSTEMA, BENTHAM AND THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 193 (1989). 
111 Posner, supra n. 106. 
112 See Stucky, supra n. 29, at 413. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Postema, supra n. 110, at 194. 
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law, but judges may also make mistakes about the law.116 This 
understanding sanctifies the law in a theoretical sense, since the 
law is always the correct rule, but judges may get the law wrong. 
Blackstone places a premium on the capacity for lawyers and 
judges to reason, to discern the correct rule and to detect errors. A 
Blackstonian approach makes adjudication inherently 
unpredictable, and this offends Bentham’s belief that the public 
should have reliable expectations about how courts would 
behave.117 Bentham also knew that courts could get things wrong, 
but he thought that judges should follow past precedents without 
exceptions so that results would at least be predictable.118  
From this very brief summary, we can already see how the 
system of distinguishing published and unpublished cases fits 
easily with Blackstone’s views, but not so much with Bentham. 
Since Blackstone believed that judicial decisions are merely 
evidence of the law, it makes sense that judges would be able to 
say that certain cases are stronger evidence than others. Moreover, 
since Blackstone trusted judges to adjust rules over time and to 
make exceptions when necessary, he would seem to have little 
difficulty with choosing to publicize their reasoning only some of 
the time. Much as we saw in Judge Kozinski’s defense of non-
publication, Blackstone wanted the courts to eventually get things 
right more than he wanted them to be consistent. But Bentham’s 
insistence on protecting public expectations would point in a 
different direction. A person who wants to know how a court 
would treat her problem does not only want to know how the 
court handles its major cases. In fact, in a system where most cases 
are treated as minor, a potential litigant would want to know as 
much as possible about what she can expect in such minor cases 
as well. The benefits of reporting these cases so the public knows 
what the courts are doing are thus considerable – especially if one 
does not trust judges to necessarily apply rules consistently. This 
 
116 Id.  at 194. 
117 Id.  at 195. 
118 Id. at 195-197. 
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general argument features prominently in contemporary critiques 
of unpublished decisions in the federal courts.119 
The differences between Bentham and Blackstone 
foreshadowed a Twentieth Century debate in legal philosophy 
about the distinction between so-called easy and hard cases. This 
question emerged through a series of books and essays known as 
the Hart-Dworkin debate. The positivists, Hart being the most 
prominent, insist that it is possible to distinguish “hard” cases 
from the broader pool of matters that come before the courts.120 
The practice of choosing to publish only some decisions depends 
on this premise; the criteria that courts use to decide whether to 
make a decision a precedent closely map the concept of a “hard” 
case.121 By contrast, Dworkin’s disciple, Andrei Marmour, 
famously declared that “there are no easy cases.”122  
The terms here are a bit misleading. An “easy” case is one 
that falls squarely within the core of a rule, and does not require 
interpretation or refinement of the rule.123 That does not really 
mean that the case is easy, in the sense that there can still be a high 
risk of error, or a substantial degree of public controversy. Even 
when a case presents a problem on which a settled rule offers a 
clear answer, it may be practically difficult for lawyers and judges 
to untangle the factual complexity of the situation. The O.J. 
Simpson murder trial was a hard case for the lawyers and the trial 
court, but it was “easy” case in the sense that it did not raise new 
doctrinal questions in criminal law. Likewise, many law school 
exam questions may fall into a category of cases that are 
challenging to get right, but nevertheless have a clearly right 
answer.  
The system of publishing only some decisions as 
precedents makes perfect since if we accept the easy-hard 
distinction. Hard cases refine the law and tell us something new 
about it. Easy cases don’t. On an easy case, a court should focus 
on just getting the decision right. But it need not labor to produce 
 
119 See, e.g, Dragich, supra n. 24, at 760 (selective publication “impedes the development of a coherent body 
of decisional law, frustrates lawyers and judges in performing their daily tasks, and threatens the legitimacy 
of the federal courts.”). 
120 See ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 95 (2005). 
121 See text, supra, at n. 45 
122 Andrei Marmor, No Easy Cases? 3 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 61 (1990) 
123 MARMOR, supra n. 120, at 97. 
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the fully reasoned opinion, because the case is not going to set a 
valuable precedent. This effort is better spent on a hard case. It 
also makes sense that legal scholarship and legal education would 
focus primarily on the hard cases – i.e., published cases. If the goal 
is to understand legal rules and doctrine, these are the cases that 
can teach us something. So long as we are comfortable with the 
positivist premise that easy and hard cases can be separated, the 
practice of not publishing all decisions does not seem 
objectionable. 
The debate about easy and hard cases closely maps a 
similar disagreement between legal realism and formalism. Legal 
realism was associated with  “rule skepticism,” a viewpoint that 
rejected the usefulness of legal rules to rules in predicting the 
behavior of courts.124 This skepticism of doctrinal rules of rule 
leads to a focus instead on actual judicial decisions, and to a desire 
to predict future decisions in place of an attempt to discern legal 
rules.125 An extreme version of this “decision theory” or 
“prediction theory” would be Jerome Frank’s statement that “All 
decisions are law. The fact that courts render these decisions 
makes them law.”126 If this were true, we can immediately see that 
it is essential for courts to make all of their decisions available to 
the public; if law is really just the decisions judges make, we clearly 
need to see the decisions if we are to understand anything about 
law. However, this version of the prediction theory is problematic 
because it has little or no room to acknowledge that a judge could 
be wrong.127 Moreover, it leaves no place for legal authorities like 
statutes and constitutions, which are not decisions, but mere 
statements of rules.128 For these and other reasons, Brian Leiter 
has declared the Hart-Dworkin debate over, with Hart the winner 
and Dworkin irrelevant.129 This may be a significant reason why 
we have generally accepted that not all judicial decisions are 
published; we accept that rules of law matter more than individual 
 
124 Michael Steven Green, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1915, 1917-1918 (2005). 
125 Green, supra note 124, at 1926 et seq. 
126 Id. at 1930. 
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 1926 et seq. 
129 Leiter, supra n. 136, at 154. 
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cases. However, even if we agree that the positivists generally get 
the better of this argument, some of the doubts raised by Dworkin 
and Bentham may yet give us cause for worry. 
But even if rules of law do matter, the prediction theory 
may still have force in a more nuanced way. Part of the problem 
with the prediction theory is that it is often expressed in an 
extreme from that leaves no room for rules to play any role. But it 
is possible to accept the supremacy of rules and still care about 
judges’ actual decisions. To illustrate why this is, we can look at an 
analogy to baseball. Chief Justice John Roberts famously invoked 
this analogy during his confirmation hearings. He said: 
 
I will decide every case based on the record, 
according to the rule of law, without fear or favor, 
to the best of my ability. And I will remember that 
it's my job to call balls and strikes and not to pitch 
or bat.130 
 
The problem with this statement, as any baseball fan knows, is 
that every umpire has a slightly different strike zone. Moreover, an 
umpire’s ball and strike calls are unreviewable.131 At first glance, 
this seems to set up a classic realist proposition: Perhaps the rule 
defining the strike zone is irrelevant, and only the umpires and 
their decisions matter.132 But that would clearly go too far. As 
Michael Steven Green explained a decade before Roberts made his 
balls and strikes allusion, the best way to think of this problem is 
to acknowledge that rules matter – and so do the individual 
decisions applying the rule. The rule anchors the individual 
decisions, which are made by umpires who are trying to apply the 
rule in good faith.133 It is thus perfectly reasonable to conclude 
that a particular umpire is applying the rule wrong.134 
As Green explained, “The rule sets up a broad standard of 
reasonableness beyond which the umpire's rulings will be invalid.”135 
 
130 CNN.com, Roberts: 'My job is to call balls and strikes and not to pitch or bat' (Sept. 12, 2005), 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/09/12/roberts.statement/index.html. 
131 Green, supra note 124, at 1991. 
132 Id. at 1992. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 1992-1993. 
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This comment about baseball is similar to recent scholarship 
observing the way that legal doctrine anchors and constrained 
judicial analysis, if one assumes that rules are indeterminate and 
the individual judges differ.136  Extending this logic, the pitchers 
and hitters need to understand both the rule as stated, and the 
tendencies of the individual umpire, which they will learn through 
experience. The game can tolerant reasonable variations between 
different umpires so long as the umpires are consistent and even 
handed with both teams. But the players need to be able to see all 
of the umpire’s individual decisions about whether each pitch is a 
ball or strike so that they can made better predictions – allowing 
them to decide better whether to swing at borderline pitches. It 
would be a problem if the umpire could somehow tell players only 
to look at his best decisions, because a hitter needs to be able to 
predict his routine decisions just as much. In this way, the fact that 
rules govern does not obviate the need to know and to analyze 
each individual decision.  
The positivist position that easy cases can be distinguished 
from hard ones is a necessary theoretical foundation for our 
present judicial system. But it may not fully justify what courts are 
actually doing, and thus does not eliminate our need to see their 
decisions. First, the theoretical premise that easy and hard cases 
are meaningfully different potentially explains why courts 
designate only some of their final, merits decisions as precedents. 
But courts make many preliminary decisions in cases that are 
nearly always left unexplained. This was a major theme of our 
studies on how the federal courts of appeal resolve requests for 
stays of removal in immigration cases.137 Like requests for 
preliminary injunctions, such requests require courts to decide 
whether a petition is likely to succeed on the merits, which is a 
high substantive legal question, and not an inherently easy one. 
We found that the courts are quite inaccurate in their predictions 
 
136 See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Constraint of Legal Doctrine, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1843, 1847-1850 (2015) 
(discussing multiple ways doctrine constrains decisions). See also Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: 
Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 280 (1997) (arguing that judicial decisions are not in 
fact unfettered.).  
137 See Marouf, Kagan, Gill, supra n. 5. 
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about how cases will be resolved on the merits.138 But courts are 
also divided doctrinally about how to apply the preliminary 
injunction standard, in that the very few published decisions 
reveals a circuit split about what the preliminary injunction 
standard should actually mean.139 The circuit courts attempt to 
address this question by issuing one or two published decisions on 
stays of removal, so as to articulate a standard, but then revert to 
deciding future stay requests through unreported, often 
unexplained rulings. Yet, it certainly seems that this is a question 
that should benefit from incremental refinement of the law 
through the process that Blackstone outlined. But it is not clear 
that this happens effectively because it is rare for such preliminary 
decisions to be published, and in fact it is the norm for them to be 
entirely unreported.140 It seems likely that there are many “hard” 
decisions about whether to grant a stay of removal at the 
beginning of an immigration appeals, but these decisions are 
normally invisible. It is understandable why courts would not want 
to devote extensive effort to articulating their rationales in 
preliminary decision-making in a routine case. But while the 
efficiency is clear, the philosophical justification is not. Nothing 
about the theory of easy and hard cases suggests that just because 
a case is preliminary in a procedural sense that it is necessarily 
“easy” in a substantive sense.141  
Second, even if easy and hard cases are theoretically 
distinct, we still have to trust actual judges to make the distinction. 
As we have seen, an important feature of Bentham’s thinking was 
a pervasive distrust of judges. Judges could conceivably err in two 
ways. They might intentionally abuse the system by consciously 
departing from settled rules of law while shielding their arbitrary 
action by making the decision unpublished. Or, more likely, judges 
might be inclined to make certain decisions unpublished because it 
is simply convenient in the context of limited resources. When a 
case presents a genuinely hard question of law, an overstretched 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 349-356. 
140 Id. at 359, 361. 
141 Many important and closely divided Supreme Court cases are technically decided at the preliminary 
injunction stage. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012); United States v. Texas, 579 U.S. ___ 
(2016). 
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judge might nevertheless decide the case with an unpublished 
decision simply because it removes the burden of producing a 
well-reasoned decision that will hold up as a precedent for the 
future. This might also be a means for a divided judicial panel to 
resolve a difficult case; as an alternative to publishing a 2-1 
decision with a strong dissenting opinion, a panel could opt to 
decide a case unanimously but without designating the decision as 
a precedent.142 The Ninth Circuit’ Judge Kozinski told Congress 
that this is common:  
 
Sometimes, differences can’t be ironed out, 
precipitating a concurrence or dissent. By contrast, 
the phrasing (as opposed to the result) of an 
unpublished disposition is given relatively little 
scrutiny in other chambers; dissents and 
concurrences are rare.143  
 
Such compromises are plausible given evidence that judges 
minimize the use of dissents and value collegiality on the bench.144  
The scenario that led to the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Anastasoff adds some weight to the critique that easy and hard case 
distinction is not workable in practice. In that case, the Eighth 
Circuit had previously issued an unpublished opinion that seemed 
to answer a question about the mailbox rule for which there was 
no other legal authority.145 This suggests that the original, 
unpublished decision was actually a hard case, involving an 
unresolved question of law, and thus it should not have been 
classified as an unpublished decision in the first place. It should 
not be surprising that this factual scenario made a panel of 
appellate judges uneasy with the rule that unpublished cases set no 
precedent and could not be cited. The mere fact that this question 
 
142 See Kozinski, supra n. 27 (arguing that if all cases were citable, judges would feel they have to make more 
dissents). 
143 Id. 
144 See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: 
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 255-303 (2013). See also Lee Epstein, 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 3 
J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101, 130 (2011) 
145 Williams, supra n. 31, at 779 
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became so decisive in a tax case suggests either that all cases have 
potential value to make law, even if they appear inconsequential at 
first, or that judges are not able to reliably decide which cases 
should be published and which should not. 
Even if we are comfortable with non-precedential decisions 
in the abstract, we might yet want judges to be transparent about 
these decisions. Judges are unlikely to ever state publicly that they 
are using unpublished opinions for anything other than the 
reasons listed in court rules. But that may not be enough to justify 
complete confidence that it does not happen. Confidence in the 
judiciary requires confidence that judges are not actually deviating 
from established rules of law in what are supposed to be easy, 
clear-cut cases. Yet, this transparency is hard to achieve. When 
courts decide to not publish a decision, they effectively ensure that 
the decision is much less likely to be subject to public scrutiny. 
This is especially so if the decision is not included in major legal 
databases, which is especially likely if the court issues no written 
decision at all, and if the decision is on a preliminary question. The 
most invisible decisions maybe those for which transparency may 
be most important to maintain confidence in the judiciary.   
This philosophical background suggests that the existence 
of invisible adjudication could unsettle the unsteady détente in this 
centuries-old debate. The apparent availability of unpublished 
decisions on standard legal research tools helps to diffuse 
misgivings about courts’ insistent on only designating some 
decisions on precedents. This apparent transparency accomplishes 
two things. Anyone who wants to know how courts will behave in 
minor or “easy” cases can see what the courts are doing. This 
answers Bentham’s concerns about public expectations. Moreover, 
since unpublished decisions can now be cited, a party who can 
show that she is disadvantaged by a court’s refusal to publish 
certain decisions can raise the issue openly to the court. 
Transparency is thus a critical glue holding together a judicial 
practice that might otherwise be harder to defend. But if, as our 
data show, there is in fact a great deal of adjudication on the 
merits of cases that never appears in Westlaw or Lexis, this 
transparency would appear to be just a façade. And if that is the 
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case, doubts about the legitimacy of the system could grow once 
again. 
 
VII. Conclusion: Toward a Study of Invisible Law 
 
A significant doubt about unpublished decisions relates to 
legal scholarship. If scholars focus only on proper understanding 
of rules – and thus only on the hard, precedent cases – they only 
study a fraction of what is actually going on in the legal system. To 
legal scholars who work on traditional doctrinal analysis, courts’ 
designations of published and unpublished decisions act like 
directional signals: Study this decision, not that decision. Scholars 
may not even always be fully conscious of this choice, because it is 
implemented through research databases. Obviously, if scholars 
want to investigate anything other than formal legal doctrine, this 
is a problem. For instance, the cultural study of the law focuses on 
“law as a social practice.”146 If one starts with the question “how 
do people experience and interpret law in the context of their daily 
lives?”147 then it matters little whether the legal questions involved 
in particular cases are easy or hard.  
A straightforward solution involves the research databases 
themselves. We would recommend that commercial legal 
databases endeavor to include the full universe of decisions in 
their databases, at least for appellate courts. Our data indicates 
LexisNexis currently includes more otherwise unpublished circuit 
court decisions than does Westlaw.  This may be for now a 
competitive advantage for Lexis, but it is a problem for legal 
practice because some firms may subscribe to only one and 
lawyers may be unaware of the comparative limitations of each 
product. Moreover, even Lexis is incomplete. When a database 
includes only some decisions in a particular category, it is difficult 
to escape questions of selection bias which would taint any 
research based on the database. 
 
146 PAUL KAHN, CULTURAL STUDY OF THE LAW 37 (2000). 
147 PATRICIA EWICK AND SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF THE LAW 33 (1998). 
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Another problem concerns transparency in research 
databases. Outside the Second Circuit,148 both Westlaw and Lexis 
seem to have a complete listing of appellate dockets, but they 
include only a fraction of the actual decision in these cases. But 
these dockets appear only if one knows where to look for them. 
Much like the PACER system from which they come, they seem 
to be available only to a researcher who already knows the docket 
number or party name. But the database should be able at least to 
tell a researcher that a certain number of decisions exist but are 
unavailable. Right now, Westlaw or Lexis give researchers the 
misleading option to show non-reported decisions in search 
results, which can create the false impression that the database 
actually includes all such decisions. It would be more informative 
for the database to tell a user that a percentage of decisions is 
unavailable and not included in search results.  
Scholars can also address these gaps in various ways. One, 
of course, is empirical legal scholarship, which aims to understand 
judicial behavior quantitatively and deliberately avoids drawing 
conclusions from a single case. Such research can be an important 
contemporary way to address Bentham’s concern about public 
expectations of the legal system. By empirically researching the full 
universe of judicial decisions, we become better able to predict 
how the judiciary is likely to decide cases based on quantifiable 
factors. But of course, such research will only be as good as the 
databases they can analyze. Non-precedential decisions are not a 
particular problem if they are accessible. But invisible cases are a 
serious challenge.  
 For our legal system, the widespread existence of invisible 
adjudication could unsettle the fragile compromises that have 
allowed unpublished decision-making to continue until now. If the 
non-publication system is far less transparent than it appears, it 
means we have to trust judges even more than previously thought. 
This is a difficult requirement, for two reasons. First, some legal 
thinkers are reluctant to trust judges much to begin with. Second, 
the argument for distinguishing precedent and non-precedent 
cases acknowledges a significant potential for judicial error. This is 
 
148 We recommend that the Second Circuit work with legal research services to correct this problem. 
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key to Blackstone’s approach to precedent. And it is central to 
both Judge Kozinski and Judge Costa’s arguments – even though 
they reach opposite conclusions about the propriety of non-
publication. If judges are prone to make mistakes, it would seem 
to be even more important to be able to see what they are doing. 
 
